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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JAMES LEE MORENO

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 950213-CA

Priority No.

2

J

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for unlawful possession
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1991), in the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable James L. Sawaya, presiding.

This Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp.
1994) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly hold that the officer's

seizure of a paper bindle from the front seat of defendant's car
was based on both probable cause and exigent circumstances, the
two requirements of the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement?
The trial court's underlying factual determinations are
reviewed for clear error, while the court's legal conclusion of
probable cause is reviewed for correctness, according the trial
court a "measure of discretion."

State v. Poole. 871 P.2d 531,

533 (Utah 1994) (reviewing the trial court's factual and legal

determinations of probable cause under the same standards applied
to determinations of reasonable suspicion, as articulated in
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935, 939 n.4 (Utah 1994)).

The same

bifurcated standard is applied to the trial court's factual and
legal determination of exigent circumstances.

City of Orem v.

Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah App. 1994).
2.

Was the officer's seizure of the bindle of cocaine

proper incident to defendant's arrest?

The trial court did not

rule on this point; however, this court may affirm the trial
court's ruling on any proper ground.

State v. Elder, 815 P.2d

1341, 1344 n.4 (Utah App. 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
United States Constitution
Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Utah Constitution
Article I, section 14
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the person or thing
to be seized.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, James Lee Moreno, was charged with unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1991) (Count
I), and prostitution, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1302 (Supp. 1991) (Count II) (R. 06).
Defendant moved to suppress all evidence resulting from the
search of his car (R. 29). The trial court denied the motion (R.
33-34) . Thereafter, defendant conditionally pled guilty to
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and the
prostitution charge was dismissed (R. 41-44, 60). The trial
court sentenced defendant to a term not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison, but granted defendant a stay, placed him
on probation and later issued defendant a certificate of probable
cause (R. 49, 60).
Defendant timely appealed from his judgment of conviction
(case no. 930009-CA) (R. 53). That appeal was briefed and
submitted to this Court, which vacated the trial court's denial
of defendant's motion to suppress and remanded the case to the
trial court for entry of adequate findings (R. 93). The trial
court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order
("Findings," R. 97-99, attached as Addendum A ) , and defendant
appealed from those findings (case no, 950213-CA) (R. 103).

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On the evening of October 23, 1991, defendant approached a
woman on Main Street in Salt Lake City and offered her $35.00 to
"party" with him (R. 73). The woman, who was acting as a police
decoy, agreed and told defendant to follow her in his car (R. 7273).

When they arrived at the parking lot of the nearby Colonial

Hotel, defendant got out of his car and locked it (R. 73).
Meanwhile, two Salt Lake City police officers, working the
undercover operation with the decoy, also pulled into the parking
lot, one in front of and one following defendant's vehicle (R.
78, 83)• Officer Harris approached defendant, arrested him for
soliciting, handcuffed him, searched him, and placed the items
found in the search, including defendant's car keys, on top of
defendant's vehicle.

Harris then accompanied defendant into a

police car, where he began writing out a citation (R. 78, 83-84) .
Following the arrest, Officer Jackson, who was also on the
scene, approached defendant's car, looked through the window, and
saw "a folded bindle, the type you carry cocaine in" located on
the passenger side front seat (R. 79, 84). Jackson walked over
to Officer Harris, who was sitting in the patrol vehicle with
defendant, and said, "I want you to come back and witness this"
(R. 79). Jackson pointed out the bindle on the front seat ta
Harris and then, taking the keys off the car roof, unlocked the
vehicle, and removed the bindle.

1

It contained a white powder,

The transcript of the hearing on defendant's motion to
suppress is attached in its entirely as Addendum B.
4

which field-tested positive for cocaine (R. 79).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The trial court properly concluded that the police officers'
entry into defendant's car in order to effectuate the seizure of
evidence in open view was constitutionally lawful because it
fulfilled both requirements of the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement.
The first element, probable cause, was established when the
officer, prior to making any intrusion, observed a paper bindle
through the car window in open view on the front seat of
defendant's car.

The officer's observation, based on their

experience, of a distinctively configured piece of evidence was
sufficient to establish probable cause that the bindle was
associated with criminal activity.
Second, the location of the evidence, presenting an obvious
invitation to theft and subsequent destruction of the evidence,
as well as protection of the public from access to the drugs,
created the exigent circumstances necessary to seize the evidence
immediately.

Contrary to defendant's assertion, there was no

showing that a telephonic warrant could easily be obtained.
PQTNT II
The seizure of the bindle of cocaine was justified under the
search incident to arrest exception against the general
prohibition against warrantless searches, as an alternative
ground for affirming the denial of defendant's motion to
5

suppress.

The exception has been expanded under New York v.

Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981), and its progeny, to
provide a bright-line rule for law enforcement to seize
destructible evidence incident to arrests, even in cases where a
defendant does not appear to have ready access or control over
seized items.

Considering the weight of authority, recognized by

Utah's appellate courts, the search incident to arrest exception
justifies the seizure of the cocaine bindles in this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
OFFICERS' WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO DEFENDANT'S
CAR AND SEIZURE OF INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE IN
OPEN VIEW WAS LAWFUL: THE OFFICERS'
OBSERVATION OF THE BINDLE PROVIDED PROBABLE
CAUSE TO EFFECTUATE THE SEIZURE; PREVENTING
DESTRUCTION OF THE EVIDENCE AND PROTECTING
THE PUBLIC FROM ACCESS TO THE DRUGS
CONSTITUTED THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
NECESSARY TO SECURE THE BINDLE IMMEDIATELY.
A.

Probable Cause.

A warrantless search or seizure will be unreasonable per se
under federal or state law unless it falls within one of the
specifically delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.
State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990); Katz v. United
States. 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 (1967).

In Utah, in

order to fulfill the requirements of the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement, the State must establish both probable
cause and exigent circumstances, State v. Morck. 821 P.2d 1190,
1193 (Utah App. 1991); however, the trial court's determination
of probable cause requires only a "substantial basis," based on
6

the totality of circumstances-

State v. White. 851 P.2d 1195,

1198 (Utah App. 1993) (reviewing the trial court's determination
of a magistrate's issuance of a warrant).
The gist of defendant's argument appears to be two-fold.
First, defendant asserts that the folded paper bindle that the
officers observed on the front seat of defendant's locked car was
insufficient to establish probable cause to open the car door and
seize the evidence.

Thus, the acts of unlocking and opening the

car door constituted an unlawful search.

And second, even

assuming probable cause arguendo, defendant claims no exigent
circumstances existed to justify seizure of the bindle without a
warrant.

Appellant's Br. at 8-13.

As to defendant's first contention, probable cause to open
the car door and remove the evidence was established as soon as
the officer, prior to making any intrusion, simply observed the
bindle in open view on the front seat through the car window.2
State v. Harris. 671 P.2d 175, 181 (Utah 1983).

At this point,

no search had occurred, defendant had no expectation of privacy
in the contraband, and the federal and state guarantees against
unreasonable searches and seizures had not yet come into play.
As the United States Supreme Court observed in a case
involving a police officer who stopped a vehicle, saw a partially

2

The open view doctrine applies to preintrusive police
observation, such as is present in this case. In contrast, the
plain view doctrine is postintrusive, coming into play only when a
lawful search is already underway. See State v. Harris. 671 P.2d
175, 181 (Utah 1983); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738, n.4 (1983)
(opinion of Rehnquist, J.).
7

concealed balloon, and then shifted his position to get a better
view:

"The general public could peer into the interior of

[defendant's] automobile from any number of angles; there is no
reason [the police officer] should be precluded from observing as
an officer what would be entirely visible to him as a private
citizen.

There is no legitimate expectation of privacy."

Texas

v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1542 (1983)
(plurality).

The view of the Utah Supreme Court is consistent

with the federal position:
The constitutional interests protected by the
prohibition against unlawful searches do not
require the police to be less observant than
the average person. Nor must a police
officer avert his gaze from contraband
because a criminal wishes to avoid detection.
A desire to avoid detection of criminal
activity does not ipso facto give rise to a
protectable privacy interest.
Thus, an officer is not expected to ignore
what is exposed to observation from a
position where he is lawfully entitled to be,
and he may view the interior of a vehicle
from such a position. That does not
constitute a 'search' within the meaning of
the constitutional provisions.
State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah), cert, denied. 454 U.S.
1057, 102 S. Ct. 606 (1981) (citations omitted).
The trial court found that at the time defendant was
arrested "Officer Jackson looked through the window of
defendant's vehicle and observed what his experience led him to
believe was a 'bindle of cocaine' on the passenger seat"

6

(Findings, par. 2 and 3, R. 98).3
3

Defendant's lengthy attack on these and other specific
findings and conclusions, Appellant's Br. at 14-19, does not
merit a commensurate response. Specifically, defendant
challenges: (1) the finding that defendant "jumped from his car
and quickly locked it," (finding #1) for lack of evidentiary
support; (2) the omission of the police officers' request, and
defendant's refusal, for consent to search his car (findings #2
and #3); (3) the sufficiency of the characteristically folded
paper to establish it as incriminating evidence before it had
actually been opened and found to contain a controlled substance
(finding #3 and conclusion #3); and (4) the conclusion that there
were exigent circumstances justifying the search when there was
no evidence that police officers were concerned that the bindle
would be stolen or destroyed (conclusion #4).
Because defendant made entirely different objections below
than he does on appeal, he has failed to preserve his specific
challenges on appeal and this Court should refuse to consider
them (see Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, R. 101-02, attached as Addendum C, objecting to findings
and conclusions that defendant's car was "sandwiched" by two
police cars, that the police officer had experience with
characteristically folded bindles and that the hotel parking lot
was open to the public). State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578, 580-01
(Utah App. 1992).
In any event, defendant's first two challenges are without
merit. First, it is apparent from the officer's rendition of the
incident, i.e, the patrol vehicles pulling up on both sides of
defendant's car and defendant's being approached as soon as he
exited, that things happened quickly. The prosecutor's statement
that defendant "jumped" out of his car (R. 88) was evidently a
characterization of defendant's movements based on the officer's
testimony and one which the trial court found reasonable. See
Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-39 (granting the trial court some measure
of discretion when determining "facts" based on a witnesses
demeanor). However, any error improperly suggesting defendant's
suspicious conduct, and thus probable cause to seize evidence, is
at most harmless. The evidence was seized not because defendant
acted suspiciously, but because it was evidence of criminal
conduct observed in open view, an independent ground establishing
probable cause, which defendant does not challenge.
Similarly, the trial court's omission of defendant's refusal
to give consent, evidence of which was based exclusively on
defendant's testimony, was evidently a reflection on defendant's
credibility. See Price. 827 P.2d at 249-50 n. 6 (deferring to
the trial court's determination of consent to search because of
its "position of advantage to observe witnesses' demeanor and
other factors bearing on credibility").
Defendant's third and fourth challenges are discussed in the
body of this brief.
9

On appeal, defendant challenges this finding, claiming that
the officer lacked sufficient experience to establish the bindle
as incriminating evidence.

Appellant's Br. at 9.

The

proceedings and testimony at the suppression hearing speak
otherwise.

Defense counsel made one foundational objection to

Officer Jackson's testimony, which was overruled (R. 81).
Officer Jackson testified without further objection, and then
Officer Harris testified without any objection.

Officer Jackson

testified that he had seen numerous bindles of the type found in
defendant's car during his three year assignment with Metro
Narcotics and that many of those bindles contained cocaine (R.
80-82) . Officer Harris testified that he had also been assigned
to narcotics and had "run into" bindles several times in his
other assignments (R. 84). He also described in detail the
characteristics of the "pharmaceutical fold" used in constructing
a bindle (R. 85-86).
Defendant also challenges the trial court's finding,
claiming that the characteristically folded paper did not
sufficiently establish it as incriminating evidence before it had
actually been opened and found to contain a controlled substance.
Appellant's Br. at 16-17.

However, the distinctive configuration

of folded paper justified the officers' belief that it contained
contraband.

See State v. Cole. 674 P.2d 119, 124 (Utah 1983)

(distinctive configuration of gun case indicated its contents).
"Some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun
case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable
10

expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred
from their outward appearance."

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.

753, 764 n.13, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 2593 (1979); Brown, 460 U.S. at
742-43, 103 S. Ct. at 1545 (probable cause to seize contraband
based on police officer's reasonable belief that a distinctively
knotted balloon was commonly used to package narcotics).

Indeed,

this Court has specifically held, in the context of the plain
view exception to the warrant requirement, that observation of a
plainly visible paper bindle discovered in the course of an
administrative search is "clearly incriminating."
Cornwall. 810 P.2d 484, 488 (Utah App. 1991).

State v.

Under the

circumstances of this case, the officers' observation amply
supports the trial court's findings that the incriminating
evidence in open view provided the necessary probable cause to
enter the vehicle in order to seize it.4
Defendant relies on State v. Larocco for the proposition
that the police officer's actions of unlocking and opening the

4

Defendant also cursorily attacks the sufficiency of the
foundation for police officers' testimony about the bindle of
cocaine found in defendant's car because the bindle was not
produced in the trial court. Appellant's Br. at 9, 12. Because
this claim is made without supporting legal argument or
authority, the Court should decline to consider it. State v.
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Price, 827
P.2d 247, 248-50 (Utah App. 1992). Appellant's Br. at 9. Also,
the claim is waived because defendant failed to object at the
hearing. See Price, 837 P.2d at 580-01. Moreover, defendant
never challenged the police officers as to whether the bindle
they seized was folded any differently than they described it at
the hearing.
11

car door constituted an unlawful search.5

Plainly, just as in

Larocco, defendant here had an expectation of privacy in the
interior of his automobile.

As the United States Supreme Court

has stated: "[A] car's interior as a whole is . . . subject to
Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable intrusions by the
police."

New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114-15, 106 S. Ct.

960, 966-67 (1986).
Here, the officers had probable cause to seize the
incriminating evidence prior to entering the vehicle, just as the
law established by Larocco requires.

The action of opening the

door did not reveal any new information, but instead only secured
the item for which probable cause to seize already existed.
Indeed, the officers' actions can be more reasonably
characterized as an entry into a constitutionally-protected area
necessary to effectuate a seizure.

This distinguishes it from a

search, which implies looking in an effort to find or discover
something and which "compromises the individual interest in
privacy."

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); See

5

The State responds to defendant's claims based on Larocco,
noting, however, that Larocco was only a plurality opinion. As
this Court has noted: "The precedential value of the Larocco
rationale is somewhat unclear . . . because Justice Durham's
reasoning was joined only by Justice Zimmerman. Justice Stewart
concurred in the result, but provided no insight into his
rationale. Because he concurred only in the result, and because
Justice Durham arrived at the result by using state constitutional
analysis, it is possible that Justice Stewart arrived at his
conclusion strictly through a Fourth Amendment approach." State v.
Stricklinq. 844 P.2d 979, 985 n.2 (Utah App. 1992).
In fact,
Justice Stewart has subsequently stated that his concurrence in
Larocco. did not signal his acceptance of Justice Durham's state
constitutional analysis. State v. Poole. 871 P.2d 531, 536 (Utah
1994) (Stewart, J.# concurring).
12

State v. Echevarrieta. 621 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah 1980).
B.

Exigent Circumstances.

Nonetheless, neither probable cause nor evidence observed in
open view alone will suffice to justify a warrantless seizure.
Morck. 821 P.2d at 1193; Larocco. 794 P.2d at 470; State v.
Belcrard. 840 P.2d 819, 823 (Utah App. 1992).

In addition, the

State must show that exigent circumstances justified the
officer's seizure of the bindle without first obtaining a search
warrant.

Ibid.

In this case, the car was parked in the parking lot of the
Colonial Hotel, located at Fourteenth South and State Street, a
hotel apparently frequented by prostitutes.

The trial court

concluded that there were exigent circumstances justifying the
warrantless seizure of the bindle because defendant's car was in
a public parking lot, open to the view of prostitutes and their
Johns, presenting the danger of theft or destruction of evidence
(Findings, par. 4; R. 98-99).

Defendant correctly points out

that there was no specific testimony supporting facts referenced
by the trial court. Appellant's Br. at 18. However, this Court
can take judicial notice of the fact that the South State Street
area is a center of prostitution in Salt Lake City and that drug
use is often associated with prostitution.

Utah R. Evid. 201.

See also State v. Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993)
(witness was both a drug addict and a prostitute); State v.
Tavlor, 599 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1979) (defendant supported her
drug addiction through prostitution); State v. Jones, 585 P.2d
13

445, 446 (Utah 1978) (same).

The bindle was on the front seat of

the car, in open view of anyone who happened to be in the parking
lot.

Further, from both defendant's and the police officers'

entries into the parking lot, it is apparent that the lot was
open to the public.

Under such circumstances, it represented an

obvious invitation to theft and subsequent destruction of the
evidence.

Prevention of destruction of the evidence, as well as

protection of the public from access to the drugs, created the
exigencies that justified the immediate warrantless seizure of
the bindle.

Morck, 821 P.2d at 1193; Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-70

(and cases cited therein).
Defendant further challenges the trial court's conclusion
that if defendant were only cited, he could drive away before the
issuance of a warrant, and that if he were taken into custody the
police would be remiss in not seizing contraband left in open
view to the public (Findings, par. 4; R. 99). Defendant
acknowledges the validity of the trial court's justification for
the seizure if he were merely cited and allowed to drive away
Appellant's Br. at 18.
However, defendant attacks the trial court's reasoning in
the event he were booked, arguing that if the police had probable
cause to apply for a warrant, they could have prevented him from
driving off by arresting him, taking him into custody, as they
did, and by remaining at the car while application was made for a
telephonic warrant.

The argument fails because, assuming

probable cause had been established by the discovery of the
14

bindle in open view, the police could neither reasonably let the
car to remain on the street following defendant's arrest nor
towed it without first seizing the bindle.
Defendant baldly asserts that "[a] telephonic warrant was
also available to the officers."

Appellant's Br. at 19. The

Utah Supreme Court has " [not decided] whether the prosecution has
the burden of proving the unavailability of a telephone warrant
in order to demonstrate sufficient exigent circumstances to
justify a warrantless search . . . ."
1255, 1267 (Utah 1987).

State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d

This Court also has twice held it

unnecessary for the State to show the unavailability of a
telephonic warrant, which is "only one of several factors
relevant to the exigency determination."

Citv of Orem. 868 P.2d

at 1393 (citing with approval Morck, 821 P.2d at 1194 n.l).
Moreover, there exists a dispute within the Utah Supreme Court
regarding the ease with which a telephonic warrant can be
obtained, suggesting that its ready availability is in doubt.
Compare Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1267-68 (Hall, C.J., noting the
substantial requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-4(2) for
obtaining a telephonic warrant and suggesting that more than a
simple phone call is necessary to obtain such a warrant) (Howe,
J., and Stewart, J., concurring) with Larocco. 794 P.2d at 470
(Durham, J., noting section 77-23-4(2) in support of "warrantswhen-practicable policy) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).

Defendant

did not argue the availability of a telephonic warrant at trial
and fails to support his bald assertion on appeal with any legal
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argument or authority as to whom the burden should be assigned.
Therefore, the Court should not consider defendant's argument
that a telephonic warrant was available in support of his
challenge to the trial court's finding of exigent circumstances.
State v. Price, 837 P.2d at 580-01 (argument not preserved in
trial court waived on appeal); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341,
1344 (Utah 1984) (refusing to consider argument unsupported by
argument or legal authority).
Given the exigencies noted by the trial court, the trial
court properly concluded that sufficient exigent circumstances
existed to justify the warrantless seizure of the bindle.
However, even if this Court should find the trial court was
mistaken in its conclusion it can justify the seizure of the
bindle as a search incident to arrest.6
POINT II
THE WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF THE BINDLE WAS
JUSTIFIED AS A SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
One of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement is a search incident to arrest.

Stricklincr, 844 P.2d

at 985. The burden is on the State to show that the
circumstances of the seizure falls within one of the exceptions.

Id.
In Chimel v. California, the Supreme Court rejected a
warrantless search of an entire house of a defendant while
6

The trial court did not base its holding on a search
incident to arrest theory; however, this Court may affirm the
lower court's decision on any proper ground. State v. Elder. 815
P.2d 1341, 1344 n.4 (Utah App. 1991).
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recognizing a limited right of the police to search the
defendant's premises incident to his arrest, i.e., areas "within
the defendant's immediate control" to prevent him from reaching a
weapon to effect an escape or destroying evidence.

Chime1 v.

California. 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969).
Since Chime1. the search incident to arrest exception, as
applied to automobiles searches and seizures, has been
dramatically broadened.

In New York v. Belton. the police

conducted a search uncovering cocaine, incident to an arrest for
speeding, of the defendant's jacket found within the passenger
compartment of the car while the defendant and three other
occupants were detained outside.

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.

454, 457-63, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2862-65 (1981).

The Supreme Court

overturned the New York Court of Appeals' rejection of the
search, notwithstanding the appellate court's finding that there
was "no longer any danger that the arrestee or his confederate
might gain access to the article."
Ct. at 2862.

Id. 453 U.S. at 456, 101 S.

Recognizing that the search incident to arrest

principle in Chime1 could be clearly stated, the Court noted that
the principle was nonetheless difficult to apply in specific
cases, and established a bright-line rule that police officers
could readily apply without engaging in a subtle analysis to
determine the probability that weapons or evidence were present.
Id. 453 U.S. at 458-61, 101 S. Ct. at 2863-64.

The Court held

that when a policeman has made a lawful
custodial arrest of the occupant of anautomobile, he may, as an incident of that
arrest, search the passenger compartment of
17

that automobile.
It follows from this conclusion that the
police may also examine the contents of any
containers found within the passenger
compartment, for if the passenger compartment
is within reach of the arrestee, so also will
containers in it be within his reach. . . .
Such a container, may of course, be searched
whether it is open or closed, since the
justification for the search is not that the
arrestee has no privacy interest in the
container, but that the lawful custodial
arrest justifies the infringement of any
privacy interest the arrestee may have.
Id. 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S. Ct. at 2864.
Relying on Belton, federal courts have consistently
permitted searches incident to arrest over the defendants' claims
that items were clearly outside their practical range of control
or accessibility.

See United States v. McCradv. 774 F.2d 868,

870-71 (8th Cir. 1985) (police opened locked glove compartment
with key removed from ignition while defendant detained in police
car); United States v. Karlin. 852 F.2d 968, 970-72 (7th Cir.
1988) (defendant handcuffed in rear of police car), cert, denied,
489 U.S. 1021, 109 S. Ct. 1142 (1989); United States v. Cotton,
751 F.2d 1146, 1147-50 (10th Cir. 1985) (defendant handcuffed
beside car in presence of two police officers).
Furthermore, many courts have permitted searches incident to
arrest in circumstances where the arrestee's access

to the item

recovered in the search was as seemingly improbable as
defendant's in this case, under the Belton rule.

See United

States v. Woodv, 55 F.3d 1257, 1269 (7th Cir.) (officers open
locked glove box with ignition key while the defendant was
18

handcuffed in the rear seat of the patrol car), pet. for cert.
filed. No. 95-5330 (July 24, 1995); State v. Ouinones, 574 A.2d
1308, 1310-11 (Conn. App.) (police officer recover bags of heroin
from locked car using key seized from the handcuffed defendant's
pocket while he was detained some distance from car by another
officer), cert, denied, 576 A.2d 546 (1990); Pack v.
Commonwealth, 368 S.E.2d 921, 922-23 (Va. App. 1988) (recovery of
cocaine from locked bag found on rear floorboard of car using key
seized from handcuffed defendant).
In Utah, searches in circumstances very similar to those
discussed above have been upheld under the Belton rule.

In State

v. Kent, the court upheld a search, yielding a sawed-off shotgun,
incident to arrest of the defendant/parolee, where the defendant
was detained and handcuffed in the presence of ten police
officers.

State v. Kent, 665 P.2d 1317, 1317-18 (Utah 1983).

This Court upheld the search of a diaper bag containing a gun
incident to the arrest of a homicide suspect.

State v. Harrison,

805 P.2d 769, 783-85 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327
(1991).

In that case the defendant and his wife were ordered to

the ground by at least two police officers while one of the
officers located the diaper bag in a baby stroller about ten feet
from the arrestees Id. at 784. Doubtful that the Harrisons could
reach the diaper bag before the officers could intervene, this
Court nonetheless relied on Belton and Kent, noting that
,f

[p]olice restraint and physical removal of the arrestee, then,

while limiting the arrestee's ability to actually reach into a
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particular area, does not automatically prohibit police from
searching that area,"

Id. at 784-85 n.29.

Defendant does not dispute that he was legally arrested for
prostitution when he exited his car.

Following his arrest,

defendant was handcuffed and placed in the rear of Officer
Jackson's car (R. 78, 83-84).

Immediately thereafter Officer

Jackson, having seen a bindle of cocaine in open view on the
front seat of defendant's car, unlocked the car with the keys
recovered from defendant and seized the bindle (R. 79). It does
not appear that the officer's entry into defendant's car went
beyond the seizure of the bindle or that the officers conducted
any further search.
On the weight of authority, this Court's recognition of the
rule in Belton, and the very fleeting and narrow intrusion on
defendant's privacy occasioned by the officers' actions, this
Court should uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to suppress on the alternative ground that the bindle was
seized incident to defendant's lawful arrest.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully
requests that the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
suppress and judgment of conviction be affirmed.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION
The application of the search incident to arrest exception
to general prohibition against warrantless searches to the facts
of this case warrants oral argument and a written published
20

opinion to further develop Utah law in^this area.
CP

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of September, 1995

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to John
R. Bucher, attorney for appellant^ 1343 South 1100 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84401, this &

day of September, 1995,
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ADDENDUM A

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
JAMES M. COPE, 0726
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE. OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER

-vs)

CaseNo.911901754FS

'

Judge James S. Sawaya

JAMES LEE MORENO,
Defendant.

The defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence came on regularly for hearing on March
20, 1992. The Court heard testimony from the defendant, James Moreno, and from police
officers Harvey Jackson and David Harris. The Court also heard argument from defendant's
counsel and the State's counsel. Based upon the foregoing, the Court now enters the following:
FINDINGS QF FACT
1.

On 23 October 1991, the defendant approached a woman on Main Street near

1400 South. The woman was working with officers Harvey Jackson and David Harris in an
effort to suppress prostitution activities in the area, but the defendant did not know this. He
offered the woman $35.00 to "party" with him. The decoy agreed and told defendant to follow
her to the Colonial Hotel parking lot. As soon as defendant stopped in the lot, his vehicle was
sandwiched by two police cars. The defendant jumped from his car and quickly locked it. He
was then placed under arrest for solicitation of prostitution.
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CaseNo.911901754FS
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2.

Officer Harris, who arrested the defendant, handcuffed and searched him incident

to his arrest. The contents of defendant's pockets were placed on the roof of defendant's vehicle.
Defendant was then taken to one of the police cars where Harris began writing a citation for the
solicitation charge.
3.

At about the same time, Officer Jackson looked through the window of

defendant's vehicle and observed what his experience led him to believe was a "bindle of
cocaine" on the passenger front seat. He pointed this bindle out to Officer Harris, then took
defendant's keys from the roof of the car, unlocked the vehicle, and removed the bindle.
4.

White powder in the bindle field tested positive for the presence of cocaine. The

defendant admitted to police officers that the bindle contained cocaine and belonged to him.
These facts lead to the following:

CONCLUSIONS QF LAW
1.

Although a warrantless search such as the one here is presumed to be illegal, Utah

law recognizes that an automobile may be searched if there is both probable cause and exigent
circumstances. State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190,1193 (Utah App. 1991).
2.

Probable cause to open the defendant's locked vehicle was established as soon as

the drug-experienced officer observed the bindle in open view on the front seat. No search had
taken place before this observation of the contraband. The police were certainly entitled to view
whatever a member of the public could see from that same vantage point State v. Lee, 633 P.2d
48,51 (Utah).
3.

Officer Jackson's seizure of the bindle necessitated his entry into the defendant's

car. The entry into the car without a warrant was justified by exigent circumstances.
4.

The exigent circumstances in this case were the obvious invitation to theft and/or

destruction of evidence which the easily-seen bindle presented for anyone looking into
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defendant's car. This parking lot was open to the public, including prostitutes and their Johns. If
the defendant were to receive only a citation, he could drive his vehicle away before police could
obtain a warrant to seize the bindle. If the defendant were to be booked, the police would be
remiss to allow such obvious contraband to be left in open view in a public place while the
vehicle's driver was taken to the jail.
5.

Officer Jackson's warrantless entry into the vehicle to seize the bindle complied

with all constitutional strictures.
BASED UPON the foregoing, the Court enters the following:

ORDER
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence in this matter shall be and hereby is DENIED.
DATED this / ^"day of February, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

JAMES S. SAWAYA, JudgtT

Approved as to form:

JOHNR.BUCHER
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact,
Conclusions Of Law And Order was mailed to John R. Bucher, Attorney for Defendant James
Lee Moreno, at 1343 South 1100 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 on the ^ 2 day of February,
1995.

Ty^Av "i^uuo
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March 20, 1993
THE COURT:

Call the matter of State vs. James

Moreno, Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The record may
show that defendant is present with counsel John Bucher;
Mr. Vuyk appearing for the state.
MR. BUCHER:

I would like to call the defendant

to the stand.
THE COURT:

That's not how we proceed usually,

is it?
MR. VUYK:

When we have police officers—-I don't

know if they are back yet.

They had to run over to a

trial.
THE COURT:

Your motion places the burden on the

state.
MR. BUCHER:

I couldn't see them out there.

I

saw them earlier-MR. VUYK:

They will be back momentarily.

If he

wants to proceed out of order, that's fine.
JAMES MORENO
Called as a witness, having been first duly sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
MR. BUCHER:
Q

Would you state your name and address?

A

James Moreno.

5447 Breckenridge Road.
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Q

Are you the defendant in this action?

1

2

A

Yes, I am.

1

3

Q

I would like to call your attention to October

1

4

23, 1991, and ask if you have had occasion to come in

1

5

contact with any police officers at that time?

1

6

A

Yes, I did.

1

7

Q

What time was that, if you recall?

1

8

A

About 8 p.m.

1

9

Q

Bow did you come in contact with them?

10
1 1

12

Where

were you?
A

1
1

I was at 14th South and State Street.

Actually

I came—it was 14th Street and Main.

1
1

13

Q

In what city?

14

A

Salt Lake City.

15

Q

What occurred at that location?

1

16

A

They said I was under arrest for prostitution,

1

17
18
19

for soliciting.
Q

the police officers that day?
A

Yes.

21

Q

Did you come in contact with an undercover

22

officer prior to coming in contact with the police

23

officers?

25 1

A

1

Is that the first time you came in contact with

20

24

1

1
1

Yes. That would be the one that so-called

"solicited".
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Q

When was that?

A

On the sane day, eight o'clock.

Q

And where was that?

A

14th Street and State.

Q

What occurred at that time?

A

A girl was out there.

headed to a party.
party.

I pulled up, and I was

And I asked her if she wanted to go

She said she was working.

I said I would give her

thirty-five dollars to go with me and party.
Q

And what occurred after you said that?

A

She then told me she would, to follow her in her

car, that we could party over at some hotel or something.
And 1 followed her, and when we got over there, she got out
of her vehicle.

I got out of mine.

I locked it, and all

of a sudden, I had officers flashing badges and telling me
to get back in my car.
Q

Where were you at this occasion?

A

At a hotel on 14th Street and State.

I don't

remember the name of the hotel.
Q

What did they say to you when they approached

A

To get back in my car, and I said, no.

Q

What did they do then?

A

Told me I was under arrest.

you?

And they told me for soliciting.

I said, "For what?"

I said, "I didn't
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1 I solicit.

I didn't solicit nobody."

Then they told me to

k I put my keys on the car and cuffed me and asked if they
could go inside my car.
was hiding something.

I said, "No." They asked me if I

I said, "No."

I just didn't want

them in my car.
Q

Where were you standing in relation to the

automobile when this conversation was going on?
A

Away from it, until they made me walk back up to

it on the back.
Q

What occurred then?

A

I was placed in a vehicle with cuffs on.

Then

they walked up and started the light in the cars. They
said, "I think he has something to hide or something.
Maybe that's a bindle or something."

They seen something,

a piece of paper or something and said, "Well, I think that
is reasonable doubt," or whatever.

So they got my keys,

unlocked it, went through it, came back out, said I was
under arrest for coke—possession.
Q

Did they ask you for your consent to perform the

search a second time?
A

Second time, yes.

Q

How many times did they ask you if they could

search your vehicle?
A

About two other times.

Q

What did they say?
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A

"Are you some kind of lawyer?

something we don't?

We have a right to go in there."

said, "Well, I can't stop you.
Q

Do you know
I

You are cops and stuff."

Where was your vehicle parked in relation to the

other automobiles at the motel?
A

Against the pool, facing north.

Q

Was it parked in the regular place where

vehicles park for the motel or parked in some other place?
A

There were other vehicles parked around the pool

area, so I would say so.
Q

Was it obstructing the lane of traffic inside

the motel?
A

No.

Q

What vehicle was that, that you are talking

about?
A

*78 Datsun station wagon.

Q

Are you the owner of that vehicle?

A

Yes.

Q

Is it registered in your name?

A

Yes, it is.

Q

Thank you.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. VUYK:

Q

You indicated that police officers asked you

twice to look at your car?
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A

Look inside, yes.

Q

Isn't it a fact that they indicated to you they

saw a bindle in plain view on the front seat of the car?
A

No.

Q

Did you make any statement to them with regard

to the cocaine?
A

No.

Q

You never told them it was cocaine for your own

personal use?
A

Not until afterwards I said it is cocaine.

Q

Bow long afterwards?

A

Nay after I was arrested.

They brought it and

showed me and was taking pictures of me, and stuff like
that.
Q

Now, you indicate that you were under arrest,

and you were handcuffed and you were in a police car; is
that right?

Any question in your mind?

A

With the strap across me.

Q

A strap across you?

You were under arrest and

had the cuffs on?
A

Yes.

Q

That's all I have.
TBE COURT:
MR. BUCBER:
TBE COURT:

Anything further.
Nothing.
You may step down.
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MR. VUYK:

I would like to call Officer Harvey

Jackson.
HARVEY JACKSON
Called as a witness, having been duly sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
MR. VUYK:
Q

Would you state your name?

A

Harvey Jackson.

Q

Your occupation?

A

Police officer for Salt Lake City.
THE COURT:

First name?

THE WITNESS:
MR.VUYK:

Harvey.

What is your current assignment?

A

I am currently assigned to burglary.

Q

In October of last year, what were you assigned

A

Special investigations and vice.

Q

And on that occasion, did you have an

to?

opportunity to come in contact with a James Moreno?
A

Yes.

Q

How did that come about?

A

Mr. Moreno made a deal with one of our decoys,

followed her back to the Colonial Hotel. We followed him
back to the hotel.
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Q

Bow did your contact come about?

A

We followed his vehicle to the hotel by the

swimming pool area.

Detective Harris was behind them with

some emergency equipment on.

I went around to the other

side of the swimming pool and pulled in front of Mr.
Moreno98 vehicle.
Q

What happened then?

A

Mr. Moreno got out, locked his door, stood

there, basically said something like, "You know, what is
going on, what's happening?"
Q

What happened then?

A

Detective Harris walked up, told him he was

under arrest for soliciting sex, handcuffed him, took him
back to his car.
Q

Did you, in fact, search him at that time?

A

Detective Harris did, yes.

Q

Where did that search take place?

A

Beside Mr. Moreno's car.

Q

What was found on him at that time?

A

He had some car keys, some cash and coins, that

type of thing.
Q

Where were they put?

A

On the roof of the car.

Q

Was Mr. Moreno then removed from that area?

A

Yes, sir.
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1 I

Q

Did you then inspect the car at all?

2 1

A

I walked back to the car, looked inside.

3 I

Q

What did you see?

4 1

A

On the passenger side there was, I believe, a

5 I dark-colored, maybe black-colored cassette holder.

In

6 I front of that looked like a folded bindle, the type you
7 I carry cocaine in.

I went back to Detective Harris and

8 I said, "I want you to come back and witness this." He
9 I walked back with me.

I took the keys off the roof of the

10 I car, unlocked it, went inside the vehicle.
11 I

Q

What did you then find?

12 I

A

I reached down, grabbed the folded paper.

It

13 I was a bindle, unfolded, with some white powder in it.

I

14 I gave it to Detective Harris. He did a field test on it.
15 I It tested positive for cocaine.
16 I
17

Q

Did you have a conversation with the defendant

after that?

18 I

A

I did not.

19 J

Q

When you looked into the car, was this bindle in

BO I plain view?
El I

A

Yes, it was.

82 J

Q

Has the defendant under arrest at the time?

D

3 I

A

Yes, he was.

*4 I

Q

That's all I have.

is

CROSS-EXAMINATION
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BY MR. BUCHER:
Q

Officer Jackson, do you have it with you?

A

I beg your pardon?

Q

Do you have the thing, described as a "bindle"

here with you?
A

No.

Q

What did it look like?

A

It was a folded piece of paper, looked like a

piece of magazine or something just folded the way they
folded bindles.
Q

Well, how big was it?

A

Probably about that size, maybe an inch and a

half.
Q

And inch and a half square. Could you see

inside?
A

No, sir, it was colored paper.

Q

Colored?

A

Well, like magazine, like it wasn't clear.

You

couldn't see inside.
Q

Looked like it came from a magazine?

A

That's what it looked like, yes, sir.

Q

Thank you.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. VUYK:

Q

Are you acquainted with this type of bindle?
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A

Yes, sir.

1

2

Q

Bow do you have that acquaintance?

1

3

A

I have seen bindles many times.

4
5
6
7

to Metro Narcotics for three years.

Q

A

Object.

Move to strike.

I don't

think there's enough foundation as to his expertise.
MR. VUYK:

Be testified he's been a narcotics

officer for two years.

12

TBE COURT:

13

MR. VUYK:

Overruled.

14

Q

Is this the type normally found?

15

A

Yes, sir.

16

Q

And it was folded in a manner you normally

V

found?

18

A

Yes, sir.

19

Q

That's all.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION

10

ll
12
•3

1

Yes, sir.
MR. BUCHER:

10
11

During that period was this the type of bindle

you normally found?

8
9

I was assigned

BY MR. BUCBER:

Q

Bow many bindles have you seen in your two years

as a narcotics officer?

1

14

A

I couldn't give you a number, quite a few.

1

15

Q

Over ten?

1

0008!

JL1

1 I

A

Yes, sir.

2

Q

And out. otttteaebiddies, t-fc*t ^joufcera««e?i,

3 I how many have been of this kind of paper?
4 I

A

I couldn't give you a number on that.

5

Q

Of the number that you have seen, of this kind

6

of paper, how many of them did it l»ter~was it later

7 I established in court it had a controlled substance inside
8

of it?

9

A

That's difficult to say, sir.

Q

Thank you.

10 I
11

THE COURT:

Mr. Vuyk, anything further?

12 I

MR. TO**.*. Ora <$&%»ti©Ti. ^*r% ttex* * l«t oi

13 I them wrapped that way that had cocaine in?
a4

THE WITNESS:

&5 I

THE COURT:

16 I

MR. VUYK:

17

Yes.
You may step down.

Call Officer Harris.
DAVID HARRIS

18 I

Called as a witness, having been first duly sworn,

19 I

was examined and testified as follows:

10

DIRECT EXAMINATION

11 I

BY MR. VUYK:

12 \

$

Vlould ^ou wt*t« *youx Tveafte*?

D I

A

David Harris.

M I

Q

Occupation?

A

Police o f f i c e r with Salt Lake City.
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Q

Your present assignment?

1

2

A

Special investigations, the vice unit.

1

3

Q

Were you so involved in October of last year?

I

4

A

Yes, I was.

1

Q

Did you come in contact in October, I believe

1

Ol

1

6

about the 23rd, with Mr. Moreno?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

How did that come about?

9

A

He were working a decoy operation.

One of the

10

police decoys had made a soliciting sex deal with Mr.

11

Moreno.

12

parking lot.

13

engaged my emergency equipment to stop the vehicle. After

14

following the vehicle for a little ways, Officer or

15

Sergeant Jackson pulled in front of it.

16

stopped.

1

I followed his vehicle to the Colonial Hotel
The vehicle entered the parking lot.

I

The vehicle

1

Mr. Moreno exited the vehicle.

1

17

Q

What did you do then?

18

A

I approached Mr. Moreno, placed him under arrest

19

1

1

for soliciting sex.

1

20

Q

Did you handcuff him?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

Did you search him?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

What did you do with the items you found on him?

1

25

A

I placed them on top of one of the cars—whether

1

1

1
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it was mine or his. Mine was directly behind his.
Q

What did you do then?

A

Placed him in my vehicle, passenger's side, sat

down next to him, began to write him a citation.
Q

He was in handcuffs at that time?

A

Yes.

Q

What happened then?

A

Sergeant Jackson approached me and told me that

he had something he wanted me to witness in Mr. Moreno's
vehicle.

I got out of the car, and Sergeant Jackson

pointed out the folded paper bindle, that was discussed
earlier, sitting on the car's front seat.
Q

What did it appear to be to you?

A

Folded bindle, pharmaceutical-type fold, orange

in color.
Q

What do you mean by pharmaceutical type?

A

That's what I have been told the fold on a

bindle is called—a "pharmaceutical" type.
Q

Have you had any experience with these bindles?

A

Yes.

Q

In what capacity?

A

I have been assigned also to narcotics and run

into them several times in patrol in my other assignments.
Q

They have a special fold, the way they are

folded?
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A

Yes.

Q

This particular item was folded that way?

A

Yes.

Q

And what did you do then?

A

I watched Sergeant Jackson open it.

It was folded in a little—in a square.

contained a white powder.
test kits for cocaine.

It

I took that, and I had field

I tested it.

It tested positive.

Q

What did you do then?

A

Placed it into evidence, eventually.

Q

What did you do.

Did you have any further

conversation with Mr. Moreno?
A

Yes, Mr. Moreno--just as I was beginning to test

it, stated, "It is cocaine." And at some point, I don't
recall when—when I was discussed it, talking with him, he
said, "I am not a dealer.
Q

It was for his private use."

That's all I have.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. BUCHER:

Q

Officer Harris, what is a pharmaceutical fold,

again?
A

The paper is folded over several times so

that—I don't know how to describe it.

But it folds a

small square piece of paper so it can hold a piece of
paper.
Q

Is that it's only characteristic?

It is folded
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into a small square piece or is it folded in a particular
way besides that?

Let me rephrase it, if you didn't

understand it.
A

I understand.

Q

Is the only way you could tell it was a

pharmaceutical fold is because it was folded into a square?
A

No.

Q

Would you tell me the other reasons you could

tell it was a pharmaceutical fold?
A

It looked like the fold that I have seen, that's

been described to me as a pharmaceutical fold on a bindle.
Q

Would you tell me what that is, by size, the

square shape?
A

I could describe how it is folded.

Q

Would you?

A

You get a square, and you fold it so that it

makes a triangle. Then you fold the edges over.

Then you

fold the top, then tuck it into the—it is hard—fold the
top over so it tucks into the bottom.
Q

Is the size of this tucking, the fact it was a

square—is there any other characteristic so I could call
it a pharmaceutical fold?
A

No.

Q

Thank you.
MR. VUYK:

Nothing further.
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THE COURT:

Step down.

Is that all the

evidence?
MR. VUYK:
THE COURT:

That's all I have.
What are you claiming, Mr.

Vuyk~plain view?
MR. VUYK:

That is right, Your Honor.

individual was under arrest, had been searched.

The
It was in

plain view.
MR. BUCHER:
THE COURT:

Your Honor.
This case that you handed me, it is

a rather lengthy opinion.
MR. BUCHER:

Would you look—the first part of

it has to do with, I believe, a plea bargain and
evidentiary problem.

Page 16, I believe, begins the

discussion of search and seizure in State vs. Hyde.

I will

not impose upon Your Honor to read it or even tell you what
it says. But here is what I think it says.

It says that

in Mr. Lorroco's case, he wants to change the search and
seizure law of automobile.

I believe what this case stands

for, if you see something inside a vehicle and exigent
circumstances exist, you go obtain a warrant for it.

If

they saw what was obviously in plain view--a knife, a body,
a syringe, contraband—if they saw a crime or contraband
leading to a crime inside of a vehicle, that's what plain
view is. Looking in there and seeing a folded up piece of
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paper I don't believe is plain view.

I believe it is

reason to believe that maybe something has happened, and it
could be probable cause to obtain a search warrant.

But in

my view of this case, Lorroco, his predecessor case cited
in Lorroco, State vs. Hyde, if my interpretation is
correct, the officers looked in there. They needed to go
get a search warrant.

I don't think it is probable cause

to see a folded up piece of paper in someone's car.
think it was an excuse to search it.

I

I think that is up to

a magistrate, a committing magistrate, who has the decision
to obtain a warrant.
was under arrest.

This man was not going anywhere.

He

There was none of the problems that

Lorroco talked about, about reaching for a gun before
destroying evidence.
MR. VUYK:

It is clear it falls under the cases

where there was a legal lawful arrest.

They have a right

to look at the car and search it to determine whether, in
fact, there are any weapons or any other type of thing.
This is the entire process the officers had reason to be
suspicious when he jumped out of the car and locked it.
They were surrounded at the time. All this leads to the
question of what could be done. Certainly, we feel that
this was appropriate, proper, and done in the process of an
arrest.
THE COURT: Let me read this case.

I will have
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1 I you a ruling within a day or two.
2 I (whereupon the hearing was concluded)

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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ADDENDUM C

FIUO DISTRICT COURT

Third Judicial District
John R. Bucher 0474
Attorney for Defendant
1343 South 1100 East
Sal, U k . Chy. Utah 84105

FEB 2 * 1995
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES LEE MORENO,
Defendant.

OBJECTION TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CaseNo.911901754FS
Judge James S. Sawaya

Come Now John R. Bucher, attorney for the defendant above and submits the following
objections to those certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the plaintiff in
the above:
1. The defendant objects to the finding that his vehicle was "sandwiched*1 by two police cars.
No testimony exists to support said finding and the correct testimony is on page 9 of the transcript.
2. The defendant objects to the statement in finding number 2 that officer Jackson had experience
which led him to believe the paper he saw in the vehicle of the defendant was oocaine.
The Officer testified that he had been a narcotics officer for two years and that he has seen bindles
folded the way the subject bindle was folded
3. No conclusion of law was ever reached that the parking lot was "open to the public"
and no evidence was ever presented in any form that the parking lot was open to the public.

Dated this.

Mailed a copy of the foregoing to Mr,
18th day of February, 1995.

Cope Esq. a Deputy District Attorney this
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